Nontechnical Summary
Financial integration has increased the interdependence between asset markets. The European debt crisis shows that fiscal trouble can transmit in unexpectedly fast ways even between sovereign bond markets. Empirical studies typically confirm the rising importance of external factors in determining the evolution of yields on domestic bond markets. However, most studies aim at the common factors without detail look at bilateral linkages between bond markets (their strength, direction and time-variation).
In this paper we analyse the bilateral linkages between EU sovereign bond markets over time using factor-augmented version of the VAR model in Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) with daily data (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) on the sovereign bond yield spreads of 16 EU countries. The method allows us to measure the spillover effect of shocks from a specific sovereign bond market to all other markets controlling for common factors and allowing for time-variation.
Our results indicate the presence of significant spillover between the sovereign bond markets of EU countries. This should not come as a surprise given continued financial and economic integration. Spillover is also important for countries outside the eurozone but considerably less so:
Central European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) seem to affect one another, Denmark, Sweden and the UK are rather insulated from other bond markets. Spillover has increased substantially and permanently since the start of the financial crisis. This rise is not alike for all countries. Bilateral spillover sent and received varies considerably between specific sovereign bond markets. Some EMU markets such as Italy, Spain or Belgium are major transmitters of shocks to EMU as a whole, probably due to the severity of trouble in fiscal conditions and their banking sectors.
We then provide a novel test for contagion by applying the multivariate structural break test of Qu and Perron (2007) on this FAVAR. The idea is to detect sudden changes in the coefficients of the VAR model, conditional on possible changes in the size and volatility of the shocks hitting the markets. We call contagion a significant change in the transmission mechanism that amplifies the effects of a shock one sovereign bond market transmits to another. We find limited evidence of contagion. Increased spillover is driven mostly by larger sized shocks being transmitted in pretty much the same way as prior to the crisis. Only the discussions at EU level on financial assistance
Introduction
Losses on subprime loans in US banks have had global consequences, as uncovered debt positions created a snowball debt effect that affected major financial institutions in both the US and Europe.
The ensuing financial crisis called for policy intervention, not just by central banks, but also out of the deep pockets of the tax payer. Massive public aid in support of the financial sector, together with falling tax revenues and spending on recovery plans to withstand the economic fall-out of the financial collapse, unleashed a sovereign debt crisis.
Turbulence on European bond markets is just the latest chapter in this string of events. Rising sovereign spreads set off a sequence of fiscal bailouts, further trouble in the banking system, the downgrading of all EMU countries but Germany, and de facto IMF interventions in several EU
countries. These events demonstrate the strong intertwining of European financial markets.
Empirical studies confirm that sovereign bond yield spreads in EMU countries are driven by international financial market conditions, and dominate idiosyncratic risk factors such as default, liquidity and exchange rate premia.
Attributing spread movements to international factors underlines the importance of financial integration, but gives an unsatisfactory answer as to what causes those market developments in the first place. Even international developments must eventually be driven by events in some domestic market that then transmits to all other markets, and feeds back to the source market. The flaw of most studies is to proxy the external risk factors with an aggregate measure that is supposedly exogenous to domestic events, and affects all markets in a similar way. However, linkages are not equally strong between all markets simultaneously (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000) . Those studies therefore have little to say on the strength, direction and time-variation of bilateral linkages between bond markets.
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Of particular concern is that those linkages could be driven by contagion. A surge in global risk aversion and risk of contagion were deemed to be significant factors behind the increase in European sovereign spreads (Codogno et al., 2003; Bernoth et al., 2012) . Rescue packages for the 1 Only a few recent studies on sovereign bond spreads have started to separate the role of global risk aversion and country-specific risk and measure the degree of spillover in the sovereign bond market using weight matrices. Caceres et al. (2010) calculate a country-specific spillover coefficient based on joint probabilities of distress extracted from CDS credit default swap spreads. Claeys et al. (2012) proxy the linkages between bond markets by economic distance measures to derive a spatial measure of financial integration and show that the spillover curbs around half of changes in domestic bond rates. Favero (2012) measures the effect of a global risk factor, whose weight depends on the distance of fiscal fundamentals vis à vis a benchmark country. banking sector and the economic fallout of the crisis cast in doubt the sustainability of public debt positions in several EU countries (Attinasi et al., 2010) . Investors seem to have been particularly sensitive to such bad fundamentals and dropped bonds quickly at times of increased turbulence on financial markets (Favero and Missale, 2012) . As a result, default and liquidity risk started to rise, also in bond markets starting from much sounder fiscal positions.
In this paper, we measure the strength and direction of all bilateral linkages for 16 EU sovereign bond markets, and propose a novel test for the presence of contagion. First, the spillover measure is based on the forecast error variance decomposition of a VAR model, as in Yilmaz (2009, 2012) . We augment the VAR with a common factor to control for EU-wide developments, and this introduces an additional feedback channel from common events to bond markets. The decomposition then shows the relative importance of domestic and foreign sources of sovereign bond spread dynamics, and provides a summary measure of the bilateral spillover between all markets. Second, the contagion test is based on the Qu-Perron (2007)(QP) break test for detecting sudden changes in the coefficients of the VAR model, conditional on possible changes in the size and volatility of the shocks hitting the markets. We call contagion a significant change in the transmission mechanism that amplifies the effects of a market subject to a shock to another one.
Applying the QP test to the VAR gives an indication of the presence of contagion across EU bond markets. More interestingly, we can track the source of this contagion by considering a QP test on a subset of VAR coefficients. In this way, we may claim if contagion spreads from a particular source.
Results indicate that whereas the overall spillover between EU bond markets has always been substantial, it increased to a permanently higher level since the start of the financial crisis.
Linkages between EMU countries are substantially stronger, reflecting their structural integration.
Some EMU markets such as Italy, Spain or Belgium are major transmitters of shocks to EMU as a whole. Spillover is also important for countries outside the eurozone but considerably less so:
Central European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) seem to affect one another, Denmark, Sweden and the UK are rather insulated from other bond markets. On the other hand, contagion has been a rather rare phenomenon limited to periods of uncertainty about financial assistance to Greece, Ireland and Portugal. These events involved important economic and policy events at EU level, but their origins are to be tracked to idiosyncratic domestic shocks, like fiscal trouble-Therefore, the frequent surges in co-movement across bond markets is mainly driven by larger shocks rather than by increased in intensity of shock transmission.
Our paper addresses several questions of MARS WS3 (the special initiative on sovereign contagion risk. i) How significant is/was sovereign contagion/spillovers in Europe? We find that sovereign spillover has been very significant across the past decade, and its intensity further increased since the onset of the financial crisis. On the other hand, most of these surges in spillover seem to be driven by larger shocks rather than by increased in intensity of shock transmission suggesting that contagion is rather a rare phenomenon. ii) Is there evidence of non-linearities or amplification effects? One amplification effect consists in the fact that idiosyncratic events in individual countries can affect the common pan-European factor, which in turn feeds back to sovereign spreads of other countries (and the country of origin itself). (iii) What are/were the drivers of sovereign contagion effects/spillovers? Spillover seems to change often at time of important economic and policy events at EU level but its origin are to be tracked to idiosyncratic domestic shocks, like fiscal trouble. (iv) Can sovereign contagion be distinguished well from developments caused by fundamentals, e.g. the unravelling of fiscal imbalances, and how? Our approach is based on high-frequency data whose dynamics is inherently different from developments of fundamentals. On the other hand, the presence of economic and policy events might complicate the picture given that some events, e.g. establishment of a new sovereign rescue fund, might objectively change the fundamentals, i.e. strengthen the repayment capacity of sovereigns. However, it is highly uncertain to decide which of these events are fundamentalchanging and which are not.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review our empirical approach to measuring sovereign bond spillover based on the VAR method of Yilmaz (2009, 2012) and how to identify contagion in this model with the QP test. The main empirical results on spillover and contagion are discussed in section 3. The final section summarises the main results and discusses some policy implications. Yilmaz (2009, 2012) propose a measure of spillover based on the forecast variance decomposition of a VAR model including prices of n different assets (x t ). A covariance stationary variable VAR(p):
Methodology

Measuring spillover with a FAVAR
with ε t~( 0,Σ) a vector of independently and identically distributed disturbances can be rewritten in its moving average representation as:
where some regularity conditions on the A i matrices apply. These moving average coefficients are the key to understanding the dynamics of the VAR. The decomposition of the variance of the forecast error of one of the asset prices i at h steps ahead records how much of the variance is due to shocks in another variable included in the VAR, h periods after the shock. Call h ij  this percentage contribution of a shock to one asset price to the time series variation in another asset price h steps ahead. Then
 in the effect of error variances in forecasting x i due to shocks to x j , over all n asset prices included in the VAR.
These h ij
 are an index number between 0 and 100 that reflects the contribution of a shock originating in one market and flowing to another, and are the key measure of spillover between any two asset markets. Let us define own variance shares h ii  as the fractions of the h-steps-ahead error variances in forecasting x i due to shocks to x i , for i=1, 2,..,n, and cross variance shares h ij  as the fractions of the h-steps-ahead error variances in forecasting x i due to shocks to x j , for i, j = 1, 2,.., n,
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) suggest using the cross variance shares to measure the spillover from one series x i to another x j , i.e., the percentage contribution of a change in daily quoted asset prices on the variation in asset prices of each particular market. The matrix Λ contains all bilateral linkages λ ij to and from two different markets:
The first column of Λ, say for market A, contains all λ jA and the column-elements are the contribution from a shock in market A to asset prices on other markets. The entry λ AA is the percentage contribution of a shock in explaining the movement of the market's own asset price.
The rows of Λ, for some market B, contain λ Bi and can be read as the spillover market B receives from a shock to other markets.
The index is not a simple measure of co-movement of markets, but measures the importance of an idiosyncratic shock in a market onto other markets, taking into account also its feedback. Prices move contemporaneously on different financial markets, but this spillover is stronger between markets that are more closely connected. As the matrix Λ measures the bilateral interdependence between markets, this method of Yilmaz (2009, 2012) improves over partial equilibrium (regression) approaches since it does not suppose a market is affected only by some exogenous conditions. Each market's movement feeds back into the overall co-movement of markets. The decomposition of the VAR provides a general equilibrium effect that measures the strength and direction of bilateral transmission between markets.
Describing all bilateral linkages in Λ is arduous, especially as adding new markets inflates the dimensions of the spillover matrix, so we condense Λ into a few summary statistics. The total spillover index TS h measures the contribution of the spillover of shocks between all the variables included in the VAR to the total forecast error variance. TS h is basically the sum of the cross variance shares across all variables (at a certain forecast horizon h), expressed as a ratio to the total forecast error variation, i.e.:
, 1 100.
The direction of the spillover a market i transmits to all other n-1 markets is measured by the sum of each column of the matrix Λ, not including the own contribution of each market:
Instead, a market i receives a spillover from all other n-1 markets, and this directional spillover DS h can be expressed as follows:
Measure (6) is the sum of the row-elements of the matrix Λ. The directional spillover tells how much of the total spillover comes from, or goes to, a particular source. The net spillover from a market i to all other markets j is then the difference between the gross shock received from and sent to all other markets, i.e.
. It is also possible to calculate then the net pairwise spillover, which shows how much each market i contributes to another market j in net terms. For this, we get:
Co-movement of asset prices additionally reflect similar responses to common shocks. The origin of these shocks may not be tracked to any specific market but reflect endogenous developments common to all; or its origin can be exogenous to the system of all markets. We therefore additionally control for the existence of common factors in the VAR. Following Bernanke et al. (2005) , we use a two-step strategy for estimating this factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR). In the first step, we use factor analysis to extract the common factors driving a significant part of the n observable random variables in x t . The factor model assumes that x t can be written in function of k
where t  is a variable mean, w 1 to w k are k factor loadings and t  is an independently distributed error term with zero mean and finite variance. One can express n observable variables in terms of k unobservable common factors, where each factor determines x t with a certain weight w. The factor model (8) requires additional moment and covariance restrictions in order to be estimated. In a first step, we impose the common assumption that the k factors are orthogonal, and use the minimum average partial (MAP) method to determine the number of factors, after which we apply the principal factor method to estimate the factor loadings. In a second step, we estimate the FAVAR, which, besides the original n variables x t contains an additional k factors F i . From the decomposition of the FAVAR, linkages occur between any two markets, and in addition the common factor(s). As a consequence, there is both a direct effect of market A on market B, and an indirect effect via the common factor(s). If some market A, for example, contributes strongly to common developments across all markets, and the common factors drive other markets in turn, then market A is indirectly linked to other markets.
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Exogenous factors can simply be included in the VAR with control variables.
Another methodological caveat of analysing linkages between financial markets is the contemporaneous (intraday) correlation of asset prices. The variance decomposition depends on the ordering of the variables in the VAR, and the cholesky identification of the VAR imposes diagonal block restrictions on the contemporaneous feedback effect between markets. Exogeneity assumptions not allowing for simultaneous feedback are not realistic when testing spillover. In line with Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) , we adopt the generalised impulse-response framework of Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) that accounts for the correlation of shocks to all markets by using the historically observed distribution of the shocks. With his generalized approach, all measures derived from the FEVD are invariant to ordering. Our identification of the FAVAR gives a causal direction of the spillover from one market to another, and furthermore excludes simultaneity thanks to the use of common factors.
Measuring contagion with break tests in the FAVAR
The strength and direction of interdependence between markets evolves over time. Co-movements sometimes stay subdued for long periods, or evolve only in a smooth fashion to suddenly switch to abrupt jumps. We examine the evolution of spillover by estimating the FAVAR model over recursive sample windows. The resulting spillover series does not allow disentangling the underlying sources of time-variation. The period-by-period changes can be related to differently sized shocks (the VAR residuals) or to modifications of the transmission mechanism (VAR coefficients). Some of these changes in transmission are the result of fundamentals, which pass either through real channels like trade or financial links, or to sudden spells of contagion across financial markets (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000) .
Typically, contagion is defined as a sudden shock in a crisis market that spreads to other markets, and whose transmission cannot be explained by a contemporaneous change in economic fundamentals (Pericoli and Sbracia, 2003) . This definition covers various theoretical models of contagion. The spread of a crisis can be the consequence of a switch from one equilibrium to another, as sunspots trigger coordination problems between market participants, or changes in economic behaviour due to informational cascades or herding by market participants.
Conceptually, contagion can be distinguished from normal interdependence as a co-movement between markets that cannot be tracked back to fundamental linkages (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000) or as excessive co-movements across markets in periods of high stress that reflect breaks in the usual transmission mechanism (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) . Contagion effects are also at heart of broader category of systemic risk (de Bandt and Hartmann, 2000) .
Empirical tests of contagion identify sudden changes in co-movement of some statistics of linkages between markets. Therefore, modelling contagion requires three steps: firstly, an identification of the common driving factors below market prices so as to isolate the shocks at some stress or crisis periods; secondly, the direction of transmission from the crisis market to another market; and finally, a measure of a significant change in this transmission across markets.
The seminal test for contagion by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) is based on a significant increase in the correlation -conditional on changes in market volatility -between two markets on some date defined a priori from market knowledge. Other tests first select the shocks from the residual outliers in a VAR defined on the asset prices to isolate the crisis-date, and consequently test the significance of a dummy series associated with these outliers in a structural model explaining asset prices to find evidence of contagion on these dates (Favero and Giavazzi, 2002; Pesaran and Pick, 2007; Bae et al., 2003) .
The identification of contagion on EU sovereign bond markets with these tests, especially during the recent turmoil, is particularly fraught with those complications. First, the procedures require some prior assumption on the existence of a crisis. Most studies take some prior stance on the occurrence of a crisis in a market. Favero and Giavazzi (2002) isolate crisis episodes from an adhoc assumption on the threshold size of the residuals.
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Financial turmoil has however been ongoing for a couple of years so that normal and crisis times cannot easily be discerned. Second, some episodes may appear as crises and spread across markets because of their importance, yet these events are not contagious per se. Crises may reflect changes in the size of shocks rather than in the transmission mechanism (Forbes, 2012) . Contagion test do not account for the changes in behavior of economic shocks. Third, most studies suppose some market is at the origin of the contagion. This is a problematic assumption as sseveral bond markets have been in a crisis contemporaneously. Favero and Giavazzi (2002) tackle this problem by setting up a VAR model that allows linkages between several markets. Defining ex ante what is the non-crisis country potentially being affected by this crisis is not obvious because of the many interlinkages between these economies. Additionally, the direction of transmission is not only bilateral. Common political and economic events at EU level have had a contemporaneous impact across EU countries. As a result, many of the previously developed tests for contagion suffer from a simultaneity bias between correlated asset prices, and from changes in co-movement unrelated to transmission but due to modification of the size and volatility of the shocks (Caporin et al., 2013) .
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This invalidates their application to the eurozone crisis.
To address these challenges, we apply a multivariate test for multiple structural changes at unknown dates by Qu and Perron (2007) The test indicates if a significant change in some market occurs, which is associated with a crisis moment for this market. The QP test explicitly allows testing separately for structural breaks in the parameters of the VAR coefficients Φ and in the covariance matrix of VAR residuals ε t . 6 We identify the abrupt jumps in the VAR coefficients and control for possible changes in the size and volatility of the shocks. In addition, the QP test controls for changes in heteroskedasticity, which eliminates a possible other flaw in detecting contagion. Note that the QP test treats breaks symmetrically. The break could be associated with an intensification or a dampening of the transmission across markets. Contagion should be associated with the former only. We distinguish the QP breakdates with a significant amplification from those that see a significant reduction in the spread across markets. Another -more explicit -way to identify the source market as being in crisis or stress is to examine the level of financial stress in markets subject to contagion vis-à-vis those that were the source of contagion around the breakdates. We use a variant of the financial stress index by Slingenberg and de Haan (2011) to evaluate the degree of financial stress in pairs of countries with an identified change in transmission. As a rule of thumb, the degree of financial stress shall be relatively higher in the source market than in the recipient of the shock. We so identify purely the changes in transmission. If this change results in a positive and significant spread across markets, we call significant breakdates evidence of contagion from a crisis market to other markets.
We can identify contagion at two different levels. A QP breaktest on the overall VAR model gives an indication of the presence of contagion between all markets. This is not irrelevant for EU bond markets given that common political and economic events may have caused multilateral contagion.
But if the source of contagion is a specific market, the drawback of the overall QP test is that it does not trace its origin. Contagion is more easily understood as a bilateral phenomenon¸ spreading from a crisis market to other markets. Therefore, we need to trace back the overall break down to bilateral linkages that are responsible for the identified break in the VAR. The QP test allows testing a subset of the VAR coefficients for structural change. We can so determine (i) which equation is this dummy significant for (i.e. which bond markets were subject to contagion) and (ii) which market this dummy correspond to (i.e. which market emits contagion).
Specification
We estimate a FAVAR to compute the percentage contribution of a change in daily quoted EU government bond spreads on the variation in the spreads of 16 EU bond markets. The spreads are 10-year sovereign bond yield spreads over the corresponding German bond yield over the period May 2000 to February 2012 (closing price).
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Bond spreads are to be preferred as a measure over sovereign CDS premia in our study as we prefer a longer sample period to examine interdependence in normal times. Prior to the financial crisis, sovereign CDS markets were often not liquid and for some sovereign issuers in Europe practically non-existent. Moreover, although CDS arguably provide a closer measure of sovereign credit risk, we look at interdependence between sovereign bond markets regardless of the source of the underlying risk. Next to credit risk, developments in bond market liquidity, inflation and exchange rates can be an additional factor of divergence between EU bond markets. However, investors effectively bear these risks and interdependence is determined by these factors too. As noted in previous research (Codogno et al., 2003 , Bernoth et al., 2013 significant variability in EU sovereign yield spreads is related to external developments. Therefore, as a first step in estimating the FAVAR model, we apply factor analysis to extract common factors from the 16 EU sovereign bond yield spreads. The MAP-method selects three factors as common drivers. shows that the first of these factors is able to explain over 70 per cent of the variance of the spreads (Table 1 ). The factor loadings are close to unity for the eurozone countries, which suggests that this factor mostly identifies developments common to the EMU. Non-eurozone countries have substantially lower loadings on this factor. The financial crisis hit all EU countries, and the second factor also reaches a peak in late 2008 and early 2009, but has steadily declined since. The third 9 A potential drawback of using spread above a risk free rate (German bond yield) is that we cannot assess the spillover to and from the reference country. This can be particularly relevant if the reference country enjoys safe haven status when investors fly to less risky and more liquid markets. German bonds have enjoyed this status on several occasions during the financial crisis. Nonetheless, they are a natural proxy of a risk-free rate for the EU sovereigns as perceived by investors. As a robustness check, we performed the FAVAR analysis also using sovereign yield spreads -also including the German one -over US 10 year bonds. The results confirm that the common EU factor is dominated by developments in the German bond market, which makes it a good proxy. 10 We used alternative methods to determine the number of factors and estimate their loadings and these checks all provide similar results. A particular restriction is that the factor analysis assumes fixed loadings over time. Given the significant changes in European sovereign debt markets, we performed the factor analysis on two subsamples with a breakdate of January 1 st 2010. Although the results pointed to some differences between the two periods, the first factor consistently explains at least 65 per cent of the variance and the factor loadings did not vary notably, i.e. the loadings for EMU countries were close to one, the loadings for CEE countries smaller and the loadings for Denmark, Sweden and the UK small or even negative. Evidence that the relative importance of different factors varies over time, albeit not greatly, is also reported in Broto and Perez-Quiros (2011) and ECB (2012). factor reaches a minimum in 2008/09 and has been rising since. Both explain much less of the overall variance and although their loadings are somewhat higher for the non-eurozone countries, they do not have an intuitive interpretation. The basic FAVAR model contains two lags of the domestic bond spreads of 16 EU countries and the prime common factor obtained in the first step.
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In line with Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) we compute the forecast error variance decomposition at a horizon of 10 days (one and a half weeks), which should be sufficient to capture the horizon at which spillover across markets occurs. We additionally control the VAR for exogenous factors, and include a short-term interest rate (EONIA) to control for the possible effects of monetary policy on the short end of the term structure. Another control variable by which we also capture the role of global bond markets is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Index (VIX). This index is often used to measure risk aversion on global markets. Volatility on markets outside Europe, especially the US, is argued to be a main driver of bond spreads.
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11 As a robustness check we have included also the other two factors but the results remained practically unchanged as the additional factors track a relatively small share of the overall bond market variance. 12 In this way, we implicitly benchmark the spillover between EU bond markets also on the evolution of global bond markets. 
Empirical results
Bilateral linkages across bond markets
We first estimate the FAVAR on the full sample, and analyse the bilateral linkages between all 16 EU sovereign bond markets. Figure 1 already suggested the presence of important interlinkages between sovereign bond markets, but also that these linkages might not be equally strong between all of them. Table 2 reports the own and cross variance shares of a shock to bond spreads onto bond markets and the common factor (each main entry displays the coefficient λ ij ). Table 2 further contains a set of summary statistics. We sum the effect of shocks to market A on all others (either including the own effect or not) in the two rows following the country effects. The right-hand column sums the effect country B receives from all other markets. Table 2 captures the direction and intensity of linkages between different sovereign bond markets, as well as the spillover between individual bond markets and the common factor. The total spillover on 16 EU bond markets amounts to 59 per cent, meaning that more than half of the variation in sovereign bond spreads can be explained by shocks to bond spreads in other countries.
The remaining 41 per cent of all movements are caused by purely domestic factors, i.e. the idiosyncratic dynamics of the domestic spread in the past. This finding is in line with what other studies find: a major part of the bond spreads is determined not by domestic factors but by international bond markets (Codogno et al., 2003; Longstaff et al., 2011; Favero and Missale, 2012) . In contrast to these studies, our result is not derived from a partial equilibrium assumption, in which global conditions cause domestic changes, but it fully accounts for the feedback of domestic markets to international markets. There are quite some differences between the strength of the idiosyncratic effect for different groups of countries. The diagonal entries in Table 2 show that the own variance share (λ ii ) is not equally strong for each country. For the eurozone opt-outs the country-specific effect accounts for over two-thirds of the changes in the bond spread. This idiosyncratic effect also dominates the spillover effect for the CE countries as it ranges between one-half and two-thirds. By contrast, the idiosyncratic change amounts to just one-quarter for the eurozone countries (with a slightly higher share for Greece, Portugal and Ireland). The EMU bond markets are more strongly integrated and shocks to spreads mostly affect other markets rather than being idiosyncratic.
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The total spillover disguises the large variety of pairwise spillover effects. We can see this from the cross variance shares in Table 2 . The bilateral linkages between countries are quite distinct between countries inside and outside the eurozone. For the three opt-out countries, the bilateral linkages both among them and with the other EU countries are weak. Less than 15 per cent of the shocks to bond spreads to these three countries spills over to other markets. The most extreme cases are Sweden and the UK, whose sovereign borrowing costs hardly have any effect on other EU countries at all.
Denmark is relatively less insulated from bond markets in the eurozone probably because of its stronger integration and its participation in the ERM II. Similarly, CE countries have limited effects on other bond markets, although their bilateral linkages are stronger than for the opt-outs.
About one-third of all the spillover to other markets only occurs between the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland themselves, which makes them a specific group. The same applies to the spillover these countries receive.
The common factor affects -and is affected by -all bond markets. As we might expect from the high factor loadings of EMU countries in the estimation of the factor model (Table 1) , most of its impact flows to eurozone countries. Common EMU bond market developments mainly have their source in Belgian, Italian and Spanish bond markets. Although the common factor transmits strongly to all EMU markets -in particular on Austrian, Finnish, French and Dutch bonds -in no market does the spillover to the common factor dominate the direct effect onto other markets. This 13 The potency of spillover across European bond markets should not come as a surprise. The gradual process of economic and financial integration, stimulated by several rounds of capital account liberalisation, financial deregulation, and the introduction of the euro has not been limited to capital and stock markets (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008) . Whereas in the past, governments relied on domestic savings held in the national banking system, they can now tap into international capital markets. In the eurozone, integration has made bond portfolios increasingly internationally diversified. Issuance in a common currency has motivated debt managers to compete for investors from other countries willing to diversify their portfolio by increasing the volume of new debt issues. Improved transparency and the elimination of some technical obstacles (such as trading systems and tax differences) has further reduced home bias and promoted integration of bond markets (Hartmann et al., 2009) . As a consequence, half of public debt is held by a pool of mostly European creditors (BIS, 2011). implies that the indirect effect is weak and does not add much to the direct spillover effect of domestic shocks.
Among the eurozone countries, we can identify three groups of countries by the strength of their bilateral spillover: (i) the core eurozone (Austria, Finland, France and the Netherlands), where domestic factors are of minor importance and countries affect each other, (ii) Portugal, Ireland and Greece, where domestic dynamics are slightly more important than bilateral (mutual) effects, and (iii) Belgium, Italy and Spain who have strong mutual bilateral effects, but both receive and pass on the effects of shocks to all eurozone markets.
The share of each of these three markets in the overall spillover is more than 50 per cent, both on the sending and receiving end. Metiu (2012) find that events in the EMU periphery mainly spread to other periphery countries, but also to Belgium and France. In the latter two studies, Belgium is the market that is particularly hit by events in other EU countries. This result endorses the use of the FAVAR approach since it accounts for both the transmission and feedback effects, and therefore ranks markets on their relative linkage to other markets.
Numerous explanations can be given for the direction and strength of all bilateral linkages. We do not attempt an exhaustive analysis of those channels, as other studies have discussed this at length, like Bekaert et al. (2011 ) or Forbes (2012 . A few channels are important to explain the strength of spillover we find. First, several studies have argued that the financial crisis has made investors rediscover macroeconomic fundamentals in bond pricing (Bekaert et al., 2011) . Investors have received a wake-up call during the crisis. The systemic importance of Belgium in EU bond markets could be due to the high debt to GDP ratio, even though its volume is small relative to the debt issues of Italy or Spain. This similarity would not explain the strong spillover per se, unless investors react in an identical way to fundamentals. Second, some studies argue that markets are mispricing sovereign bonds due to perceptions of investors that spillover across EMU countries is strong, both through trade linkages and the financial sector, but the policy reactions have been weak. Several papers have looked at the joint dynamics of sovereign and bank risk (Aizenman et al., 2011; Acharya et al., 2011) . In the case of Belgium, it economically belongs to the core EMU countries, and has (had) an internationally developed banking system with strong exposure to the EMU periphery. For example, the Belgian banks Fortis and Dexia were among those with the highest exposure to US subprime loans and Greek public debt respectively (BIS, 2011). Spanish banks are exposed to problems in the domestic financial sector and could transmit this to their foreign branches. Belgian, Italian and Spanish banks moreover mutually hold large portions of public debt (BIS, 2011) . Second, some papers have argued that sovereign defaults may occur in sequence as investors recompose their portfolios to reduce risk and cut losses once one sovereign might go in default. Recent papers in the literature of endogenous sovereign risk include Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) and Lizarazo (2013) .
Commonalities in the EU sovereign bond market are mostly common developments within the eurozone. By contrast, non-eurozone countries and especially the UK, stand rather apart. The evidence suggests that this separation might be driven by exchange rate differences relative to the euro area. This suggests that, non-eurozone countries have been able to contain mispricing on their sovereign risk (De Grauwe and Ji, 2012, Poghosyan, 2012) .
Time-variation in spillover in EU sovereign bond markets
The full sample estimates summarise the linkages between markets. Arguably, the strength of these linkages evolves over time. Spreads in all EU countries moved closely together since early 2002 until the financial crisis made spreads rise and the European debt crisis made spreads EMU countries diverge. As in Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) , we look at the time-evolution of these linkages and therefore run the VAR model over a 200-day rolling window.
We summarise the time evolution of the total spillover index between all bond markets in Figure 3 .
We observe that the linkages between markets have not been limited to the recent periods of financial turmoil. The spillover has been substantial most of the time, as the index never falls 22 below 50 per cent.
14 The most relevant change occurs at the start of the financial crisis. Prior to the crisis, the total sovereign bond spillover oscillates between 55 and 70 per cent, and we observe a few specific spikes, for example after 9/11, the application of the Excessive Deficit Procedures (EDP) to some EU countries (March 2003) and the revision of the Stability and Growth Pact in March 2005. The high overall level of spillover confirms the evidence of other studies on the crucial role of external factors in driving bond spreads (Codogno et al., 2003; Bernoth et al., 2012) . long term bonds of EMU countries are still not completely aligned (Hartmann et al., 2009 ). Some differences in EU government bond markets remain due to differences in liquidity and the availability of derivatives markets for these assets, and a different response of national markets to global factors (Favero et al., 2010) .
Even over a period of strong interlinkages, there have been some major sudden fluctuations. In order to provide a closer view on the evolution of spillover during the financial crisis, Figure 4 shows a close-up image of Figure 3 installed Papandreou government to be much larger than previously published. This revision was followed by a series of events in Greece and the eurozone, such as fiscal bailouts and trouble in the balance sheets of banks.
We noted in Table 2 that the overall spillover from Greece onto other bond markets is rather small.
This evidence based on the whole sample might seem rather counterintuitive given the political and economic events since 2009 (Mink and De Haan, 2013) . In Figure 5 , we present the timevarying estimates of the spillover from Greece to other markets (the columns of Table 2 ). In order not to clutter the graph with a decomposition of all 16 markets, we have assembled the spillover into 4 groups of countries following the panels in Figure 1 (but Greece itself is excluded from the EMU periphery group).
Two observations on Figure Figure 4 shows that there was no particular event at EMU level to create this disconnect between Greece and other bond markets. Mink and De Haan (2013) argue that after acknowledging the bad state of Greek public finances in early 2010, investors started to put a higher weight on the domestic fiscal position and discerned the problems of Greece from other EU sovereigns. This arguably reduced the spillover from Greece to the rest of the EU. This disconnect has not continued to hold as a strong reversal in the degree of spillover has taken place in the spring of 2011. This increase in the effect of Greek fiscal problems mainly affects the EMU countries. During the summer of 2011, the impact on other periphery countries, in particular Italy and Spain, rises strongly. These reversals reflect the ongoing discussions at the EU level regarding the bailout of Greece. The rescue package of July 2011 does not seem to have separated the fiscal trouble in Greece from other bond markets as the spillover remains at a high level since.
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The latter part of the sample displays market behaviour that might be consistent with
De Grauwe and Ji (2012). They argue that the surge in spreads is disconnected from the rise in public debt ratios and is a sign of mispricing of sovereign risk, which might be due to uncertainty on a solution to the debt crisis (Aizenman et al., 2011) . 
CEE
Our results show that sovereign bond spillover may flare up as strong underlying interdependence raises vulnerabilities to shocks. We can see this ripple effect even better by isolating the spillover from Greece to Spain and Italy (Figure 6 ), which are the largest countries being to date affected by the sovereign debt crisis. Figure 6 again confirms that the time variation in spillover is very significant. In particular, spillover rose strongly up until the first deal on bailing out Greece.
Investors did not continue to discern Greece from the other countries in the EMU periphery throughout 2011, and spillover to Spain and Italy flared up again strongly in June 2011, until the first intervention of the ECB in August 2011. Interestingly but not entirely surprisingly, the spillover towards both countries has an almost identical temporal pattern. Moreover, Figure 6 also demonstrates that the mood of the market can reverse very quickly in either direction. 
Robustness checks
We have controlled for common bond market developments by including a common factor in a FAVAR. The importance of this factor can be seen from calculating matrix Λ for a VAR including only the 16 bond spread series without the common factor (see Table A .1 in the Appendix). The total spillover is about 5 per cent lower, since the feedback from the common factor to each market is now incorporated into the evolution of the domestic spread. This feedback is particularly stronger for the eurozone countries. The own variable shares (i.e. the diagonal elements of Λ) are therefore larger, as is the spillover from the domestic to other markets. Therefore, omitting this common factor might cause upward bias in the own variance share, as the feedbacks of common EMU events are not taken into account. This again attests to the importance of the commonalities between EMU bond markets.
An alternative way to take the common factor into account is to de-factorise the spread series for each country and retain only the idiosyncratic evolution of the spread in the FAVAR. The spillover should just reflect the transmission across bond markets of idiosyncratic shocks, at least if the transmission of the common factor is identical across markets. For markets like Belgium, Italy or Spain that share common developments (Table 2) , the own variance share indeed increases, and the spillover to other markets is limited (see Table A .2 in the Appendix). In contrast, the model mostly owes to country-specific shocks the deviation from a common factor in markets that do not have much in common with the others. The consequence is that the spillover from these markets to the others is much stronger now (at 66 per cent). Two contrasting cases are the periphery and core EMU countries. Since the former have been driving rising spreads in the eurozone, the common factor absorbs most of the spillover. Any other country-specific deviation has affected the spread only domestically (for more than 50 per cent in Greece, Ireland or Portugal). By contrast, the spread in the core EMU has not followed the rise of the EMU periphery to the same extent, but it is still correlated with the spreads in other EU countries (Figure 1 ). The spillover between the core EMU bond market and the other bond markets is therefore much higher (as is the total spillover in this model). For the same reason, the importance of the opt-out countries (Denmark, Sweden and the UK) on the spillover transmission increases substantially.
In addition to alternative specifications of the FAVAR model, we check the baseline model on some parameters. These confirm that our previous results are robust to (i) changes in the number of lags included in the VAR, (ii) the number of steps ahead when computing the variance decomposition, and (iii) the sample window. VAR models with 4 lags (instead of 2), a 20-daysahead (instead of 10-days-ahead) forecast and a 400-day (instead of 200-day) rolling window all depict a similar evolution of the spillover over time (Figure 8 ). 
Testing for contagion on the EU sovereign bond markets
We did not discuss the nature of interdependence between markets so far. The sudden spikes in the spillover index suggest an excess co-movement that is disconnected from fundamentals, and spreads from a bond market in crisis to other markets. This could be contagion as changes in economic fundaments are unlikely to occur at such abrupt fashion. Some of the identified spikes also correspond to periods when market contagion has been often mentioned in the media.
The fluctuations in the spillover series cannot be used as such for inferring contagion. The spillover series is just a particular transformation of the VAR variance decomposition but does not reveal the underlying sources of these changes. We adopt a formal statistical procedure to identify structural breaks driven by a sudden change in the transmission mechanism as evidence of contagion.
In the remainder of the analysis, we focus on a subset of EU countries over the period of the European debt crisis. The first reason is that we found the linkages between the eurozone bond markets to be much stronger than with those markets that still bear exchange rate risk (the CE countries and those EU countries opting out of the euro). The second reason is that for the eurozone countries, the period of the financial crisis is the more interesting one. Several studies have debated evidence of contagion on bond markets. From the discussion in section 3.2, we also learned that the total spillover increased substantially after 2007. Formally, we can test whether a structural break occurs in the generalised FAVAR model with the Bai et al. (1998) In a first step, we apply the multivariate Qu-Perron test for a change in all parameters of the VAR to a dataset of weekly observations of the 10 EMU bond yield spreads, starting in the first week of January 2009 till the last week of January 2012. We set the trimming percentage for the minimum length of a sequence to 20 per cent of the sample, and allow for a maximum of five breaks. The test statistics, together with the breakdates and their confidence intervals are reported in Table 3 .
The WD max test rejects the null of zero structural breaks and the sequential F-test further indicates three breaks are significant (out of a maximum of five) in the VAR coefficients. The sum of the change in coefficients before and after the breakdate are reported for each bond market, and measure the change in transmission each market spreads to others (the column elements in (3)).
A first significant break occurs in the first two weeks of August 2009. This break does not correspond to any particular event we detected before in Figure 4 ). The sum of the coefficients of other markets shows a particularly marked -but negative -change for Belgium. This suggests that the effects of other EMU countries on the Belgian market declined considerably. This could be Of the three possible dates with evidence of contagion, we retain a single one related to the situation of Greek public finance, because of the strengthening of the transmission effect on other EMU countries (i.e. coefficients increase for Greece in the VAR equations of the other countries).
This result shows that contagion is not prevalent during the eurozone crisis. The result seems at odds with the eyeball evidence from the spillover index in Figure 3 where several very apparent breaks are present. It demonstrates that most of this spillover is driven by larger sized shocks being transmitted in pretty much the same way as prior to the crisis. Caporin et al. (2013) show similar evidence -with Bayesian quantile regressions -of a rather constant propagation of shocks on European CDS markets. Our result also complements Mink and de Haan (2013) arguing that price of sovereign debt of Portugal, Ireland, and Spain, responded to both news about the economic situation of Greece and news about a Greek bail-out as captured by abnormal returns on sovereign bonds. They hypothesize that this might rather be sign of 'wake-up call' than contagion when investors reassess vulnerability of other countries. Our method is able to rule out contagion explicitly at most times showing that these abnormal returns of other countries under stress were a a similar response to disproportional shocks rather than vice-versa.
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The breakdates suggested by the QP test are an indication of an overall change in the FAVAR model. The QP test can equally be applied on a subset of parameters in the model. Trying all possible combination would be infeasible for space constraints; therefore we concentrate our attention on the common suspects (i.e. countries under stress) both in terms of markets that emit contagion and those subject to contagion. We take the same example of Greece to check the spread of contagion from the trouble on the Greek bond market to other eurozone markets. As the previous results suggested a single event with contagion coming from Greece, we look for a single break on the VAR coefficients showing the transmission from Greece to other markets. The results in Table 4 show a single significant break, located towards the end of May 2010. This finding is in line with the previous result that the uncertainty surrounding the aid packages to Greece created on eurozone bond markets. The VAR coefficients for the subsamples delimited by the breakdate show no evidence of an upwards jump in coefficients in the direction of a particular market, but rather that contagion is evenly spread across all markets. Note: the table shows the WD max test for the existence of a break in the coefficients, and the sequential test statistics for comparing the significance of the n th + 1 break against the n th break. Estimated break dates are shown together with the 90 per cent confidence interval. Coefficients shown are the sum of the changes in the VAR coefficients associated with the transmission from each bond market, before and after the breakdate. Significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Note: the table shows the WD max test for the existence of a break in the coefficients, and the sequential test statistics for comparing the significance of the n th + 1 break against the n th break. Estimated break dates are shown together with the 90 per cent confidence interval. Coefficients shown are the sum of the changes in the VAR coefficients associated with the transmission from each bond market, before and after the breakdate. Significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
The very concept of contagion refers to the situation when the transmission strengthens from a market under high stress to a market under relatively lower stress. The lengthy nature the eurozone crisis makes a distinction between normal and crisis times rather complicated. In fact, looking at a financial stress index, developed by Slingenberg and de Haan (2011) , for the whole EU (i.e. sum for 16 countries included in our analysis) in Figure 8 would classify the whole period since late 2008 as high stress. The index is continuously several standard deviations above its mean, which is normalized to zero. The structural breaks in the VAR coefficients detected by the QP test in this period suggest limited contagion. Descending from the overall VAR to bilateral linkages, we can measure the degree of financial stress from a source and receptor market around the time of the breaks in transmission. 
Conclusion
The speed with which fiscal problems have spread across eurozone countries has come as a surprise. A crisis was not expected to initiate a string of fiscal bailouts, a collapse of the banking system and the involvement of the IMF in EU countries. Events since the start of the debt crisis in November 2009, coupled with a very rapid rise in bond spreads and the downgrading of all EMU countries but Germany, show how intertwined eurozone sovereign bond markets are. The strength of spillover is the result of economic and financial integration, which gradually proceeded since the start of the EMU. Additionally, stronger linkages, combined with economic imbalances and a weak economic policy, show the EU is also at risk of contagion on bond markets.
In this paper, we first measure spillover across the EU sovereign bond markets on a bilateral basis adapting the generalised VAR approach of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) to account for common developments. We use daily data on bond spreads of 16 EU sovereigns (of both EMU ins and outs) over a long sample (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) that covers both the tranquil period as well as the financial crisis.
Our results indicate that spillover has been a common feature of European sovereign bond markets but since the start of the financial crisis interdependence increased substantially. Nevertheless, there is a lot of heterogeneity in the bilateral linkages sent and received between specific markets.
The Belgian, Spanish and Italian bond markets are strong transmitters of shocks, as the spillover coming from and going to these countries spike during the crisis. The reason is that fiscal troublecombined with a large banking sector -increase the effect of shocks to and from these bond markets.
Consequently, we propose a test of contagion applying the QP break test to the FAVAR model.
The novelty of our approach is to test sudden changes in transmission with an endogenous search for breaks in transmission controlling for the size and volatility of shocks to markets, and to determine the direction of contagion. The strong interdependence we detect does not imply increased susceptibility to contagion. We find limited evidence of contagion during the eurozone fiscal crisis on the occasion of requests for financial assistance by Greece, Ireland and Portugal.
These events created policy uncertainty that spread across EMU bond markets. Yet, most of the other increases in co-movement across bond markets are driven by stronger shocks (as also reported by Mink and de Haan, 2013) through an otherwise identical propagation mechanism.
The political response to the eurozone crisis has been hesitant as it was often held up by doubts on the consequences of a sovereign default in Greece, Ireland or Portugal. Proponents of a bailout fear an immediate default of other eurozone sovereigns, as the spread of financial trouble to Spain and Italy might trigger an implosion of the European banking system and even the end of the eurozone itself, causing the "mother of all financial crises" (Eichengreen, 2010) . Opponents to intervention hammer on the need to ensure fiscal discipline first, and avoid the moral hazard that might favour fiscal profligacy in the future. According to this view, a cascade of default is unlikely as debt positions have been unwound and can anyway be contained by intervention in banking markets.
Our results show that both views are consistent. In normal times, an orderly solution to a debt crisis is possible. Strong underlying interdependence raises vulnerabilities to shocks so that contagion may suddenly flare up and lead to mispricing of sovereign risk in turbulent times (Aizenman et al., 2011; De Grauwe and Ji, 2012) . A Greek default would have likely have a cascade effect across EMU if no other common policy actions are taken to stem contagion across markets.
